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RECENT DECISIONS
the Azoff Don Bank. Title was at all times vested in Lewine. He
simply parted with the custody of the fund for a specified purpose
and maintained the Russian bank as his agent for forwarding orders
to defendant. That the latter was fully cognizant of the special nature
of the account is aptly shown by the wording of its telegram in
accepting the account: "Received Kidder, Peabody $200,000.-order
Engineer A. Lewine." Why should either bank be concerned with
the orders of this Russian merchant, if the funds were the property
of the Russian bank? Most certainly, defendant contending that
absolute ownership was vested in the bank, would not be, since it
knew neither the individual nor his signature.
From this last statement it logically follows -that defendant had
no contractual relationship with plaintiff. 3 All its negotiations and
dealings were with the Azoff Don Bank, but as previously stated the
letter of transmission informed it that the former was not a principal
but an agent acting for plaintiff. Concededly the wording of the
Russian bank's letter is not entirely unambiguous and defendant complains that it was error for the trial court to exclude evidence of the
practice of New York banks; evidence which, if admitted would
explain the meaning of these words and show that disposition of
funds so marked was controlled by custom. 4 Inasmuch as defendant
has paid out the major portion of the deposit upon advice from the
Russian bank by order of plaintiff, the evidence was properly excluded. The Court of Appeals in awarding its judgment for plaintiff
has so decided.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-STATE STATUTE PROVIDING FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NoN-RESIDENTS.-Plaintiff, a resident of Penn-

sylvania, while driving an automobile on a highway in New Jersey,
struck a wagon on which defendant Pizzutti was riding, damaging it
and injuring him and his horses. Defendant instituted suit in the
Supreme Court of New Jersey and, after serving Wuchter according
to the terms of the statute, he obtained a judgment interlocutory
against him. This statute provides for service upon the Secretary
of State only, without requiring that official to notify the person sued.
Notice of the proposed execution of a writ of inquiry of damages was
served personally on Wuchter in Pennsylvania, though the statute
was silent on the matter of service. A final judgment was entered.
Wuchter, who hitherto had not appeared, appealed to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, contending that the act was unconstitutional,
'Morse,

Banks and Banking (5th Ed.) 408 Sec. 178; Heath v. New

Bedford Safe Dep. Co., 184 Mass. 481, 69 N. E. 215 (1904) ; Carthage Tissue
Paper Mills v. Carthage, 200 N. Y. 1, 93 N. E. 60 (1910).

' Shoyer v. Wright-G. Co., 240 N. Y. 223, 148 N. E. 328 (1925) ; Merchants
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being in contravention of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. That court's judgment for defendant
was affirmed by -the Court of Errors and Appeals, and plaintiff
thereupon obtained a writ of error to review that decision. Held,
judgment reversed. There is no reasonable probability that the
proposed defendant, under such statute, would receive notice of the
bringing of a suit. Wuchter v. Puzzutti, 276 U. S.13, 48 S. Ct. 259
(1928).
Section One of the statute in question states that 1 "any * * *
operator of any motor vehicle, not licensed under the laws of * * *
New Jersey * * * who shall accept the privilege * * * of driving
such a motor vehicle * * * in the State of New Jersey * * * shall
* * * make the Secretary of State * * * his * * * agent for the
acceptance of any process in any civil suit by any resident of the
State of New Jersey * * * arising out of * * * any accident within
the State in which a motor vehicle operated by such * * * operator
is involved." That the State may legislate as to the use of its
highways by non-residents has already been decided by the Supreme
Court.2 The license act of New Jersey, requiring a non-resident
to appoint a State official his agent to accept service for civil
suits growing out of such operation before registration, is valid.3 A
statute with -the same tenor as the one at issue has been sustained in
the Federal Courts. 4 The distinguishing feature of that statute, however, was that the State official was required to notify the non-resident
by registered mail of the service. The question arises then, must the
statute, to be valid, contain provisions making it probable -that the
notice of service on the State officer will be communicated to the nonresident defendant? As the court points out, the omission of such
provision is manifesly unfair and opens the door to fraud. The mere
fact that notice of a proposed assessment of damages was in this case
served, does not avail the defendant, since the statute did not provide
for it and it was, therefore, no service at all. That being so, the State
Court of New Jersey never had jurisdiction of the plaintiff, and the
judgment was in absolute disregard of the plaintiff's rights.
The New York Law Journal 5 editorially comments on this case,
and its view is that the court has departed from its recognized practice to the evident detriment of this particular defendant. It states
that the Supreme Court has always based its constructions of State
statutes on those of the State courts and rarely, as in this case, has it
ever anticipated such construction. It also says that the New Jersey
Court of Errors and Alipeals might quite logically have interpreted
'Chap. 232, Laws 1924 (P. L. 1924 p. 517).
2

Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 622, 59 L. Ed. 385, 35 Sup. Ct.
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this statute as requiring such service as was held to be necessary to
make it constitutional.
It is difficult to see how such interpretation could be made in the
light of the Massachusetts case. There the statute specifically directs
the Secretary of State to notify the defendant by registered mail.
Here no such direction is incorporated, and it seems too conjectural
to say that the New Jersey court might have read it in by implication.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-EFFECT OF TAXING
POWER-RIGHT OF FOREIGN CoRPoRATIoN.-The defendant in this

action sought to impose upon the plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation
authorized to do business in Pennsylvania, a tax on gross receipts
according to the terms of a statute of that State.' This law provides
"that every * * * transportation company * * * now or hereafter

incorporated or organized by or under any law of this commonwealth
or now or hereafter organized or incorporated by any other State or
by the United States or any foreign government and doing business
in this commonwealth and owning (or) operating * * * any railroad
: * * or other device for the transportation of freight or passengers
or oil * * * shall pay to the State Treasurer a tax of 8 mills upon the
dollar upon the gross receipts of said corporation * * * received
from passengers and freight traffic transported wholly within this
State * * *."

The plaintiff carried on a general hacking business in and about
Philadelphia.
The highest court of Pennsylvania held the tax valid and affirmed
a judgment in favor of the commonwealth.2 Plaintiff obtained a
writ of error contending that the statute imposing this assessment
violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court held that a foreign corporation by obtaining permission to do business within a State is not
estopped from objecting to the enforcement of that State's enactments
which may conflict with the Federal Constitution, and further, that
the United States Supreme Court is not bound by a State court's
characterization of attacks but may be guided rather by the practical
operation of the law and may deal with it according to its effect.
The equality clause on which this appeal is grounded does not forbid
a State to classify for purposes of taxation, but it does require that
the classification be not arbitrary but based upon a real and substantial difference, having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.3 The Supreme Court, by a divided vote-6 to 3decided in favor of the plaintiff. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Common'Act Pa. June 1, 1889, P. L. 431, Sec. 23 (Pa. St. 1920 Sec. 20388).
2287 Penn. 161, ..34 A. 404 (1926).
'Power Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 493, 47 S. Ct. 678, 679 (1927).

